Click on the title of a paper below to get to a .pdf of that paper. Most of these can also be accessed on PhilPapers and Academia.edu.

• “The Right Stuff,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2015), pp. 665-687.
• “Do You Know That You Are Not a Brain In a Vat?” Logos and Episteme V, 2 (2014), pp. 161-181. (If the journal’s link is not working, you can also find the paper here: https://www.dropbox.com/s/x6vmushclw0lm55/Markosian.BIV.pdf?dl=0.)
• Review of Caspar Hare’s On Myself, and Other, Less Important Subjects, in The Philosophical Review 123 (2014), pp. 360-366.
• “The Truth About the Past and the Future,” in Fabrice Correia and Andrea Iacona (eds.), Around the Tree: Semantic and Metaphysical Issues Concerning Branching Time and the Open Future (Springer, 2014), pp. 127-141.
• “A Spatial Approach to Mereology,” in Shieva Kleinschmidt (ed.), Mereology and Location (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 69-90.
• “Two Puzzles About Mercy,” Philosophical Quarterly 63 (2013) pp. 269-292.
• “Agent Causation as the Solution to All the Compatibilist’s Problems,” Philosophical Studies 157 (2012), pp. 383-398.
• “A Simple Solution to the Two Envelope Problem,” Logos and Episteme II, 3 (2011), pp, 347-357.
• “Identifying the Problem of Personal Identity,” in Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Time and Identity (MIT Press, 2010), pp. 127-148.
• “Physical Object,” in Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa, and Gary S. Rosenkrantz (eds.), A Companion to Metaphysics, 2^nd Edition, (Basil Blackwell, 2009), pp. 486-489.
• “Rossian Minimalism,” Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (2009), pp. 1-16.
• “Three Problems for Olson’s Account of Personal Identity,” Abstracta Special Issue I (2008), pp. 16-22.
• “Restricted Composition,” in John Hawthorne, Theodore Sider, and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics (Basil Blackwell, 2008), pp. 341-363.
• “Against Ontological Fundamentalism,” Facta Philosophica 7 (2005), pp. 69-84.
• “Simples, Stuff, and Simple People,” The Monist 87 (2004), pp. 405-428.
• “Soc it to Me? Reply to McDaniel on MaxCon Simples,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2004), pp. 332-340.
• “Two Arguments from Sider’s Four-Dimensionalism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2004), pp. 665-673.
• “A Defense of Presentism,” in Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 1 (Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 47-82. Reprinted in Michael Rea (ed.), Arguing About Metaphysics (Routledge, 2009); and in Sally Haslanger and Roxanne Marie Kurtz (eds.), Persistence: Contemporary Readings (MIT Press, 2006).
• “Time,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2002, 2008).
• “Critical Study of Robin Le Poidevin (ed.) Questions of Time and Tense,” Nous 35 (2001), pp. 616-629.
• Review of Peter Ludlow’s Semantics, Tense, and Time in The Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001), pp. 325-329.
• “Sorensen’s Argument Against Vague Objects,” Philosophical Studies 97 (2000), pp. 1-9.
• “What Are Physical Objects?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000), pp. 375-395.
• “A Compatibilist Version of the Theory of Agent Causation,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1999), pp. 257-277.
• “Brutal Composition,” Philosophical Studies 92 (1998), pp. 211-249.
• “Simples,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1998), pp. 213-226.
• “The Paradox of the Question,” Analysis 57 (1997), pp. 95-97. Preprinted in Analyst (the electronic supplement to Analysis) 2 (1996). Portuguese translation, “O Paradoxo da Pergunta,” published in Disputatio 1 (1996), pp. 23-25.
• “On the Argument from Quantum Cosmology Against Theism,” Analysis 55 (1995), pp. 247-251.
• “The Open Past,” Philosophical Studies 79 (1995), pp. 95-105.
• “The 3D/4D Controversy and Non-Present Objects,” Philosophical Papers 23 (1994), pp. 243-249.
• “How Fast Does Time Pass?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1993), pp. 829-844. Reprinted in William R. Carter (ed.), The Way Things Are: Basic Readings in Metaphysics (McGraw-Hill, 1998).
• “On Language and the Passage of Time,” Philosophical Studies 66 (1992), pp. 1-26.
• “On Ockham’s Supposition Theory and Karger’s Rule of Inference,” Franciscan Studies, 48 (1988), pp. 40-52.